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FROM WEAK LEARNING TO STRONG
LEARNING IN FICTITIOUS PLAY
TYPE ALGORITHMS
BRIAN SWENSON†⋆, SOUMMYA KAR† AND JOA˜O XAVIER⋆∗
Abstract. The paper studies the highly prototypical Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm, as well
as a broad class of learning processes based on best-response dynamics, that we refer to as FP-type
algorithms. A well-known shortcoming of FP is that, while players may learn an equilibrium strategy
in some abstract sense, there are no guarantees that the period-by-period strategies generated by
the algorithm actually converge to equilibrium themselves. This issue is fundamentally related to
the discontinuous nature of the best response correspondence and is inherited by many FP-type
algorithms. Not only does it cause problems in the interpretation of such algorithms as a mechanism
for economic and social learning, but it also greatly diminishes the practical value of these algorithms
for use in distributed control. We refer to forms of learning in which players learn equilibria in some
abstract sense only (to be defined more precisely in the paper) as weak learning, and we refer to forms
of learning where players’ period-by-period strategies converge to equilibrium as strong learning. An
approach is presented for modifying an FP-type algorithm that achieves weak learning in order to
construct a variant that achieves strong learning. Theoretical convergence results are proved.
Key words. game-theoretic learning, repeated play, fictitious play, strong convergence
1. Introduction. Fictitious Play (FP), introduced in [1], is one of the oldest
and best-known game theoretic learning algorithms. FP has been shown to be an
effective algorithm for distributed learning of Nash equilibria in various classes of
games including two-player zero-sum games [2], generic 2 ×m games [3], supermod-
ular games [4, 5], one-against-all games [6], and potential games [7, 8]. However, the
manner in which players learn in FP is often unsatisfactory, especially in the context
of distributed control.
In FP, players learn equilibrium strategies in the sense that the time-averaged
empirical distribution of players’ actions converges to the set of Nash equilibria —
a form of learning known as convergence in empirical distribution. This notion of
learning tends to be problematic when the limit set of a learning algorithm contains
mixed-strategy equilibria. In particular, convergence of the time-averaged empirical
distribution to a mixed-strategy equilibrium does not imply any form of convergence
in players’ period-by-period strategies or actions. In practice, players’ period-by-
period strategies tend to move in progressively longer and longer cycles around an
equilibrium set—the time-averaged empirical distribution is driven to equilibrium,
but the period-by-period strategies never approach the equilibrium set themselves.
In the context of repeated-play algorithms, we refer to convergence of the empiri-
cal distribution (or some function thereof) to an equilibrium set as weak convergence,
and we refer to any form of learning involving weak convergence as weak learning. We
refer to the convergence of players’ period-by-period strategies to an equilibrium set
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as strong convergence, and we refer to any form of learning involving strong conver-
gence as strong learning. Intuitively speaking, weak learning means that players learn
an equilibrium strategy in some abstract sense (i.e., convergence in empirical distri-
bution) but may never actually implement the strategy they are learning. In strong
learning, not only do players learn an equilibrium strategy, but they also implement
it.
FP is proven to achieve learning only in the weak sense, and thus no guarantees
can be made regarding the convergence nor optimality of players period-by-period
strategies. For example, Jordan [9] presents a continuum of games for which FP
achieves weak learning, yet in all but a countable subset of games, the period-by-
period strategies produced by FP never approach the game’s unique equilibrium. As
another example, Young [10] presents a 2×2 game in which FP achieves weak learning,
but the period-by-period actions produced by FP achieve the lowest possible utility
in every stage of the repeated play (see also Section 3.2).
Our first main contribution is the presentation of a simple variant of FP that
converges strongly to equilibrium. In our strongly convergent variant of FP, play-
ers gradually and independently transition from using the FP best response rule to
determine the next-iteration action, to using their current empirical distribution as
a probability mass function from which they sample to determine the next-iteration
action. We show that, for any game in which FP can be shown to converge weakly
to equilibrium (and for which a certain robustness assumption holds—see A.8), our
variant of FP will converge strongly to equilibrium.
One advantage of this approach is that it is readily applicable to more general
FP-type learning algorithms. Our second (and more general) main contribution is a
method for taking a weakly convergent FP-type learning algorithm, and constructing
from it, a strongly convergent variant. We study a general class of FP-type algorithms
and show that, so long as an algorithm achieves weak learning in a sufficiently robust
sense (see A.8), then a strongly convergent variant of the algorithm can be con-
structed. As an example of how the general result may be applied, we consider three
weakly convergent FP-type algorithms—classical FP, Generalized Weakened FP [11],
and Empirical Centroid FP [12,13]—and construct the strongly convergent variant of
each.
1.1. Related Work. An overview of the topic of learning in games can be
found in [10, 14]. Various problems associated with learning mixed-strategy equi-
libria in best-response-type learning algorithms (including FP-type algorithms) are
discussed in [9]. In particular, the issue of weak convergence is considered, along with
a discussion of some of the underlying mechanics that lead to weak convergence.
Many learning algorithms are designed to ensure that their limit points are pure-
strategy equilibria [15–19]. Ensuring convergence to a pure strategy is a natural way
of ensuring strong learning, since weak learning can generally only occur when the
limit set contains mixed strategies.
In contrast, this paper studies a method of ensuring strong convergence when the
limit set of the algorithm contains mixed strategies. The ability to (strongly) learn
mixed equilibria is important for many reasons, the foremost being that, in finite
games, the set of Nash equilibria (NE) is only guaranteed to be non-empty if mixed
equilibria are considered. Mixed strategies play an important role when the learned
strategy needs to be robust to uncertainty in opponent behavior or game structure,
or secure against the actions of malicious players [6, 20–23]. With regards to FP in
particular, it was recently shown in [24] that, for the class of near-potential games,
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the limit set of the FP dynamics (weakly speaking) is a neighborhood of a mixed
equilibrium.
Regret-testing algorithms [25], [26] achieve strong convergence to mixed-strategy
equilibria in generic finite games. However, such algorithms operate on fundamentally
different principles from FP-type algorithms—players implement a form of exhaustive
search to coordinate on a NE strategy. Such algorithms tend to have slow convergence
rates, especially when the number of players or available actions is large.
Stochastic FP (SFP)—introduced in [27]—was proposed as a learning mechanism
that could (i) mitigate the problem of weak convergence to mixed equilibria in FP and
(ii) provide a reasonable explanation for why real-world players might learn mixed-
strategy equilibria. In SFP, the issue of weak convergence is addressed by smoothing
each player’s best response correspondence with the addition of small random shocks
or perturbations. The stable points of SFP are not Nash equilibria, but rather Nash
distributions. The set of Nash distributions converges to the set of Nash equilibria as
the size of the perturbations goes to zero [27]. SFP has been shown to obtain strong
convergence to the set of Nash distributions in various classes of games [8, 14, 28].
Moreover, if the perturbations are permitted to gradually decay throughout the course
of the repeated play, then SFP converges to the set of NE [11].
In contrast to SFP, the present work does not consider the descriptive agenda
of providing an explanation for why real-world learners might act according to a
given behavior rule. Furthermore, we present a simple and intuitive procedure for
modifying a variety of weakly convergent learning algorithms in order to obtain a
strong convergent variant. From a technical perspective, the current work differs
from SFP in that the best response correspondence is not directly smoothed in any
way.
The work [11] by Leslie et al. studies a useful generalization of FP termed Gen-
eralized Weakened FP (GWFP). Among other contributions, the paper demonstrates
that the convergence of FP is not affected by asymptotically decaying perturbations
to players’ best response sets. This result provides a cornerstone for our proofs by
ensuring that FP (and GWFP) meet the critical robustness assumption A.8. We
study a strongly convergent variant of GWFP in Section 6.2. Furthermore, [11] also
presents a payoff-based, actor-critic learning algorithm based on GWFP that achieves
strong learning. Our work differs from this in that we provide a general method
for constructing a strongly convergent algorithm from a weakly convergent one in a
setting where instantaneous payoffs information may or may not be available.
Our preliminary results on strong convergence in FP is found in [29]. The present
work expands on [29] by considering algorithms beyond classical FP and establishing
more general conditions under which convergence can be attained (in particular, see
A.1–A.3). Furthermore, [29] contains a gap in reasoning in the proof of Lemma 2
which the present paper fills in.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up notation
to be used in the subsequent development. Section 3 introduces classical FP and
discusses the problem of weak convergence in classical FP. Section 4 presents the
strongly convergent variant of classical FP and states the strong convergence theorem
for classical FP. Section 5 presents the general notion of an FP-type algorithm, then
presents the strongly convergent variant of an FP-type algorithm, states the general
strong convergence result in the context of an FP-type algorithm, and presents the
proof of the result. In Section 6, the general result is applied to prove strong conver-
gence in classical FP, Generalized Weakened FP, and Empirical Centroid FP. Section
3
7 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Setup and Notation. A game in normal form is represented by the triple
Γ := (N, (Yi, ui)i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players, Yi denotes the
finite set of actions available to player i, and ui :
∏
i∈N Yi → R denotes the utility
function of player i. Denote by Y :=
∏
i∈N Yi the joint action space.
In order to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria it is necessary to consider the
mixed extension of Γ in which players are permitted to play probabilistic strategies.
Let mi := |Yi| be the cardinality of the action space of player i, and let ∆i := {p ∈
R
mi :
∑mi
k=1 p(k) = 1, p(k) ≥ 0 ∀k} denote the set of mixed strategies available to
player i—note that a mixed strategy is probability distribution over the action space
of player i. Denote by ∆n :=
∏
i∈N ∆i, the set of joint mixed strategies.
In this context, we often wish to retain the notion of playing a deterministic
action. For this purpose, let Ai := {e1, . . . , emi} denote the set of “pure strategies” of
player i, where ej is the j-th cannonical vector containing a 1 at position j and zeros
otherwise.
The mixed utility function of player i is given by Ui(p) :=
∑
y∈Y ui(y)p1(y) . . . pn(y),
where Ui : ∆
n → R. When convenient we sometimes write Ui(p) as Ui(pi, p−i), where
pi denotes the mixed strategy of player i and p−i denotes the mixed strategies of all
other players. The set of Nash equilibria is given by NE := {p ∈ ∆n : Ui(pi, p−i) ≥
Ui(p
′
i, p−i), ∀p
′
i ∈ ∆i, ∀i ∈ N}. Let
BRǫi(p−i) := {ai ∈ Ai : U(ai, p−i) ≥ max
αi∈Ai
U(αi, p−i)− ǫ} (2.1)
be the i-th players set of ǫ-best responses to a strategy profile p−i adopted by the
other players. Note that in this definition we only consider pure-strategy ǫ-best re-
sponses. Denote by vi(p−i) := maxpi∈∆i Ui(pi, p−i), the value obtained by playing a
best response.
Throughout, we assume there exists a probability space (Ω,F ,P) rich enough to
carry out the construction of the various random variables required in this paper. For
a random object X defined on a measurable space (Ω,F), let σ(X) denote the σ-
algebra generated by X [30]. As a matter of convention, all equalities and inequalities
involving random objects are to be interpreted almost surely (a.s.) with respect to
the underlying probability measure, unless otherwise stated.
2.2. Repeated Play. Suppose players repeatedly face off in the game Γ. Denote
by t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} a round of the repeated play. Let {ai(t)}t≥1 denote the sequence of
actions taken by player i, where ai(t) ∈ Ai, and let {a(t)}t≥1, a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , an(t))
denote the sequence of joint actions.
Let {Ft}t≥1 be a filtration (sequence of σ-algebras) that contains the informa-
tion available to players in round t of the repeated play. For t ≥ 1 and αi ∈
Ai, let g(αi, t) ∈ R be an Ft−1-measurable random variable with gi(αi, t) :=
P(ai(t) = αi|Ft−1), and let gi(t) ∈ ∆i be the vector with components gi(t) :=
(gi(α1, t), . . . , gi(αmi , t)), where mi is the cardinality of Ai. We say gi(t) is the
mixed strategy used by player i in round t, and we say {gi(t)}t≥ is the sequence of
period-by-period (mixed) strategies used by player i. The sequence of joint period-
by-period strategies is given by {g(t)}t≥1, g(t) := (g1(t), . . . , gn(t)).
Denote by qi(t) ∈ ∆i, the empirical distribution of player i. The precise manner
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in which the empirical distribution1 is formed will depend on the algorithm at hand.
In general, qi(t) is formed as a function of the action history {ai(s)}
t
s=1 and serves
as a compact representation of the action history of player i up to and including the
round t. The joint empirical distribution is given by q(t) := (q1(t), . . . , qn(t)).
Unless otherwise stated, d(·, ·) denotes the standard Euclidean norm. For m ≥ 1
and S ⊂ Rm define the distance from p ∈ Rm to S ⊂ Rm by d(p, S) := inf{d(p, p′) : p′ ∈
S}. We say a repeated-play learning process converges weakly to equilibrium if for
some map f : ∆n → ∆n there holds d(f(q(t)), NE) → 0 as t → ∞. In most
cases in this paper, f will simply be the identity function. We say a repeated-play
learning process converges strongly2 to equilibrium if d(g(t), NE) → 0 as t → ∞.
Note that weak learning implies that players learn an equilibrium strategy, but may
never actually begin to implement the strategy that is being learned. On the other
hand, in strong learning players both learn an equilibrium strategy, and implement
the strategy that is being learned (see Section 3.2 for more details).
3. Fictitious Play.
3.1. Fictitious Play. Let
qi(t) :=
1
t
t∑
s=1
ai(s), (3.1)
be the normalized histogram3 of the actions of player i.
FP may be intuitively understood as follows. Players repeatedly face off in a stage
game Γ. In any given stage of the game, players choose a next-stage action by assuming
(perhaps incorrectly) that opponents are using stationary and independent strategies.
Thus, in FP, players use the marginal empirical distribution of each opponent’s past
play, qi(t), as a prediction of the opponent’s behavior in the upcoming round and
choose a next-round strategy which is a best response against this prediction.
A sequence of actions {a(t)}t≥1 such that
4
ai(t+ 1) ∈ BRi(q−i(t)), ∀i, (3.2)
for all t ≥ 1, is referred to as a fictitious play process. FP has been studied extensively
to determine the classes of games for which it can be said to converge (weakly) to
the set of Nash equilibria. Among other results, it has been shown that FP leads
to weak learning in two-player zero-sum games [2], potential games [7], and generic
2×m games [3]. We summarize these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let Γ = (N, {ui(·)}i∈N , Y
n) be a two-player zero-sum game,
potential game, or generic 2 ×m game, and let {a(t)}t≥1 be a fictitious play process
on Γ. Then d(q(t), NE)→ 0 as t→∞.
3.2. Weak Convergence in Fictitious Play. The following example (see [10],
p. 78), while fairly simple, clearly illustrates the phenomenon of weak convergence in
1The term empirical distribution is often used to refer explicitly to the time-averaged histogram
of the action choices of some player i; i.e., qi(t) =
1
t
∑t
s=1 ai(s). Here, we allow for a broader
definition that will permit interesting and useful algorithmic generalizations.
2The notion of strong convergence presented in this paper is comparable to the notions of “con-
vergence in intended behavior” presented in [27] and “convergence in strategic intentions” given
in [10].
3Recall that the actions ai(t) ∈ Ai are dirac distributions in the mixed-strategy space ∆i.
4In all variants of FP discussed in this paper, the initial action ai(1) may be chosen arbitrarily
for all i.
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FP, and demonstrates why weak convergence can be a deeply unsatisfactory notion
of learning.
Fig. 3.1
Consider the two-player asymmetric coordination
game shown in Figure 3.1. The game has three Nash
equilibria: both players play A, both players play B,
and an asymmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The game is a potential game [7] (in fact, an iden-
tical interests game [31]) and hence falls within the
purview of Theorem 3.1—regardless of the initial con-
ditions, players engaged in an FP process will learn an
equilibrium in the weak sense that d(q(t), NE) → 0
as t→∞.
Suppose that the players are engaged in an FP
process on this game, and in the first round they mis-
coordinate their actions (e.g., one chooses A, and the other chooses B). Young [10]
shows the somewhat counterintuitive result that the FP dynamics will in fact lead
players to miscoordinate their action choices in every subsequent round of the learning
process. Thus, despite the fact that limt→∞ d(q(t), NE) = 0, the players’ realized
action choices are extremely suboptimal—yielding the lowest possible utility in each
round of play. Intuitively speaking, this phenomenon occurs when players’ actions
cycle in such a way as to drive the time-averaged empirical distribution to a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium, yet player’s period-by-period strategies never constitute
(nor even approach) a Nash equilibrium themselves.
It may be said that in weak learning players “learn” a NE strategy in some
abstract sense, but never actually implement the strategy they are learning. In strong
learning, players not only learn a NE strategy, but they also physically implement the
strategy that is being learned.
The following section presents a simple modification of FP that achieves strong
learning; i.e., players’ period-by-period strategies converge to equilibrium in addition
to convergence of the empirical distributions.
4. Strong Convergence in Classical Fictitious Play. Consider a variant of
FP in which the action for player i at time t is chosen by drawing a random sample
from the mixed strategy (i.e., probability distribution) gi(t), where
gi(t) ∈ BRi(q−i(t− 1))ρi(t) + qi(t− 1)(1− ρi(t)), (4.1)
ρi(t) ∈ [0, 1], and limt→∞ ρi(t) = 0. Intuitively, this is similar to the classical FP
process (3.2), but rather than playing a deliberate best response each round, players
gradually transition toward drawing their stage t action as a random sample from
their own empirical distribution, qi(t).
The idea is that players will play a best response sufficiently often so that, per
FP, the empirical distribution q(t) will be driven toward equilibrium, as in Theorem
3.1. Then, since ρi(t) → 0 as t → ∞, the mixed strategy gi(t) tends towards qi(t),
which is itself tending towards equilibrium. Informally, (4.1) captures the main idea
of strongly convergent FP. A formal presentation of the algorithm is given below.
4.1. Strongly Convergent Variant of Classical FP. Consider a variant of
FP in which the action for player i at time t is chosen according to the following
randomized rule:
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ai(t) ∼ g
′
i(t) :=
{
bi(t− 1), if Xi(t) = 1,
qi(t− 1), otherwise,
(4.2)
where bi(t − 1) ∈ BRi(q−i(t − 1)), the notation ai(t) ∼ g
′
i(t) indicates that the
action ai(t) is drawn as a random sample
5 from the probability mass function g′i(t),
Xi(t) ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable, and qi(t) is the player’s empirical distribution as
defined in (4.4) below. Let Ft := σ({a(s), X1(s), . . . , Xn(s), b1(s), . . . , bn(s)}s≤t), and
note that g′i(t) is Ft-measurable. Let
ρi(t) := P(Xi(t) = 1| Ft−1),
and note that ρi(t) is Ft−1-measurable. Intuitively speaking, ρi(t) represents the
probability that player i deliberately chooses to play a best response strategy in
round t given the history of play up through the previous round. We make the
following assumptions regarding each player’s probability of deliberately choosing a
best response:
A. 1. lim
t→∞
ρi(t) = 0, ∀i ∈ N , a.s.,
A. 2.
∑
t≥1
ρi(t) =∞, ∀i ∈ N , a.s.,
A. 3. lim
t→∞
∑t
k=1 ρi(k)∑
t
k=1 ρj(k)
= 1, ∀i, j ∈ N, a.s.
The first assumption ensures that players eventually transition towards playing
their next-stage action as a sample from their empirical distribution rather than play-
ing a deliberate best response. The second assumption ensures that, for each player,
a deliberate best response is played infinitely often. The third assumption ensures
that the number of deliberate best responses taken by each player remain relatively in
sync.6 In practice, players may choose their deliberate best responses completely asyn-
chronously; for example, setting ρi(t) = 1/t
r, ∀i, with r ∈ (0, 1], results in (purely)
independent sampling of deliberate best response rounds and secures A.1–A.3.
Let
ℓi(t) :=
t∑
k=1
Xi(k) (4.3)
count the number of times player i has deliberately played a best response until and
including round t. Note that ℓi(t) is Ft-measurable. The empirical distribution qi(t)
is defined recursively as7
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) +
1
ℓi(t+ 1)
(ai(t+ 1)− qi(t))Xi(t+ 1). (4.4)
Intuitively speaking, the empirical distribution (4.4) is updated only over rounds when
a deliberate best response was played. Note that qi(t) is Ft-measurable.
8
5The action ai(t) ∈ Ai is technically a dirac distribution over the finite action space Yi (see
Section 2), and the mixed strategy g′i(t) is a probability distribution over Yi. More precisely, the
notation ai(t) ∼ g
′
i(t) means that an action yi(t) is drawn as a random sample from g
′
i(t) with
ai(t) := δyi(t)(yi), where δyi(t)(yi) = 1 if yi = yi(t) and δyi(t)(yi) = 0 otherwise.
6Note that since ρi(t) is only required to be Ft−1-measurable, this parameter is in fact adaptively
tunable. This is a feature of practical interest since it allows players to adjust their deliberate best
response rates on the fly—possibly adapting to the (initially unknown) deliberate best response rates
of others and to underlying process dynamics—in order to satisfy A.1–A.3.
7To initialize the process, let the action ai(1) be chosen arbitrarily, let qi(1) = ai(1), and let
Xi(1) = 1 for all i.
8Note that, (4.2) implicitly assumes that players have knowledge of the empirical distributions
7
Finally, let
gi(t) := bi(t− 1)ρi(t) + qi(t− 1)(1− ρi(t)), (4.5)
and note that gi(t) is Ft−1 measurable.
9 More importantly, note that for every
αi ∈ Ai, gi(αi, t) = P(ai(t) = αi| Ft−1), and thus gi(t) represents the mixed strategy
(conditioned on past play) used by player i in round t. The joint mixed strategy used
in round t is given by g(t) := (g1(t), . . . , gn(t)).
We refer to a process where, for each player i, ai(t) is updated according to (4.2),
qi(t) is updated according to (4.4), and gi(t) is updated according to (4.5) as the
strongly convergent variant of (classical) FP (for reasons to be clear soon).
4.2. Strong Convergence in Classical FP: Main Result. The following
result states that in the strongly convergent variant of FP, players’ period-by-period
mixed strategies converge to the set of Nash equilibria—i.e., strong learning is achieved.
Corollary 1. Let Γ be a two-player zero-sum game, potential game, or generic
2 × m game. Assume A.1–A.3 hold. Then the strongly convergent variant of FP
achieves strong learning in the sense that limt→∞ d(g(t), NE) = 0 almost surely.
In order to prove the above result, we first study a more general notion of fictitious
play and then prove the result as a corollary of the general theorem (see Theorem
5.1). Taking this general approach allows our strong convergence results to be be
applied to other FP-type algorithms, e.g., Generalized Weakened FP (Section 6.2)
and Empirical Centroid FP (Section 6.3). The proof of Corollary 1 is given in Section
6.1.
4.3. Simulation Example. In order to demonstrate the learning properties of
strongly convergent FP, we simulated classical FP and strongly convergent FP in a
simple two-player matching pennies game with utility functions as shown in Figure
4.1a. The game has a unique (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both
players choose either action with probability 1/2. Figure 4.1b shows the period-
by-period strategies generated by classical FP. Players’ strategies are always pure
and progress in continuously lengthening cycles. While the time-averaged empirical
distribution is being driven to equilibrium, the period-by-period strategies clearly are
not.
Figure 4.1c shows the period-by-period strategies generated by strongly conver-
gent FP with ρ(t) = t−.35. Players’ period-by-period strategies are converging to the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
Figure 4.1d shows the utility received by the realized joint action a(t) in each
round of repeated play for both learning algorithms. The received payoffs in clas-
sical FP cycle around the value of the game, while the received payoffs in strongly
convergent FP converge to the value of the game.
One possible tradeoff in strongly convergent FP is that less frequent deliberate
best response actions and less frequent updating of the empirical distribution (see
of opponents when computing a best response. This may be accomplished by assuming that players
actions are accompanied with a “tag” indicating whether or not the played action was a deliberate
best response. Alternatively, the information regarding qi(t) may tracked by the individual player i
and disseminated by a gossip-type algorithm [12] or implicitly disseminated through a payoff-based
scheme.
9To see this, note first that qi(t − 1) and ρi(t) have been shown to be Ft−1 measurable. Fur-
thermore, this implies that BRi(qi(t − 1)) is Ft−1-measurable. Lastly, by construction, bi(t) ∈
BRi(qi(t − 1)) is Ft−1-measurable.
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Fig. 4.1: 4.1a: Matching pennies payoff matrix, 4.1b: The probability of each player playing
heads in round t using the classical FP algorithm, 4.1c: The probability of each player playing
heads in round t using the strongly convergent FP algorithm, 4.1d: The received utility in
round t given the realized action a(t), 4.1e: The empirical distribution process of the action
H (heads) for player 1 in both FP and strongly convergent FP.
(4.4)) may lead to a slow-down in convergence rate. The empirical distribution pro-
cesses for player 1 in each algorithm is shown in Figure 4.1e with ρ(t) = t−.35.
5. General Setup. In this section we study strong learning in FP-type algo-
rithms —a class of algorithms that generalizes FP and includes many learning pro-
cesses based on best-response dynamics.10 In Section 5.1, we define the notion of an
FP-type algorithm. In Section 5.2 we present some examples of an FP-type algorithm.
In Section 5.3 we define the strongly convergent variant of an FP-type algorithm. In
Section 5.4 we provide the general strong convergence result for an FP-type algorithm
(see Theorem 5.1), and in Sections 5.5–5.7 we prove the general result.
5.1. FP-Type Algorithm. An FP-type algorithm generalizes classical FP in
the following ways: (i) the notion of a player’s empirical distribution is generalized,
(ii) players are permitted to use a function of the empirical distribution (rather than
use the empirical distribution itself) as a predictor of the next-round strategy of op-
ponents, (iii) convergence to equilibrium may occur in terms of a function of the
empirical distribution (rather than convergence to equilibrium of the empirical distri-
bution itself), and (iv) limit sets other than the set of NE are permitted.
We define an FP-type algorithm as follows. Let players be engaged in repeated
play of a stage game Γ. Let ai(t) represent the action of player i in round t ∈
{1, 2, . . .}, and let Hi(t) := {ai(s)}
t
s=1 represent the action history of player i up to
and including round t.
10The class of FP-type algorithms proposed here is similar in spirit to the class of best-response-
based algorithms considered in [9].
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In classical FP, for each player i, the normalized histogram of the player’s action
choices (3.1) is used as a compact representation of the player’s action history. In
the general formulation of an FP-type algorithm, we still suppose that players track a
compact representation of the action history, but we allow the compact representation
to take on a fairly general form,11 as stated in the following assumption:
A. 4. The empirical distribution of player i is of the form qi(t) := f
q
i (Hi(t), t),
where f qi (·, t) :
∏t
s=1Ai → ∆i. We make the following assumption regarding the
sequence of functions {f qi (·, t)}t≥1 used to form the empirical distribution sequence
of player i:
A. 5. For any history sequence {Hi(t)}t≥1 for player i, there holds limt→∞ ‖f
q
i (Hi(t+
1), t+ 1)− f qi (Hi(t), t)‖ = 0.
In particular, this implies that—regardless of the action history—there holds
limt→∞ ‖qi(t+1)− qi(t)‖ = 0 for each player i. This fairly mild assumption captures
the essential characteristics required for our asymptotic analysis, and may be seen
as a generalization of classical FP where exact averaging of actions over time yields
‖qi(t + 1) − qi(t)‖ ≤
1
t
(see Section 5.2.1). Together, assumptions A.4–A.5 allow
us to consider a variety of FP inspired algorithms, including those with general step
sizes [11] and those with more intricate history dependent rules such as derivative
action [32].
In an FP-type algorithm, players form a prediction of the future behavior of
opponents as a function of the current empirical distribution. Let pi(t) be player i’s
prediction of opponent strategies for the upcoming round (t+ 1). We assume,
A. 6. Player i’s prediction pi(t) of opponent behavior is of the form pi(t) =
fpi (q(t)), where f
p
i : ∆
n → ∆−i is a Lipschitz continuous, time-invariant function.
We say a sequence of actions {a(t)}t≥1 is an FP-type process if for all i ∈ N and
all t ≥ 1, ai(t + 1) ∈ BR
ǫt
i (pi(t)), where BR
εt
i (·) is the εt-best response set (recall
(2.1)), and {ǫt}t≥1 is a sequence satisfying limt→∞ ǫt = 0.
In many variants of FP, including classical FP, learning occurs in the sense that
d(q(t), NE) → 0. We generalize this notion of learning by allowing for limit sets
other than the set of NE and allowing for convergence in terms of a function of q(t)
rather than permitting convergence only in terms of q(t) itself.
Let E be some target equilibrium set (not necessarily the set of NE). An FP-type
process is said to learn elements of E if for each i there exists a function f ξi satisfying:
A. 7. The function f ξi : ∆
n → ∆i is Lipschitz continuous and time invari-
ant, and such that, for ξi(t) := f
ξ
i (q(t)) and ξ(t) := (ξ1(t), . . . , ξn(t)) there holds
limt→0 d(ξ(t), E) = 0. We refer to ξ(t) as the asymptotic learning distribution, and
f ξi as the convergence map of player i.
In general, we will denote an instance of an FP-type learning algorithm by Ψ =
({f qi (·, t)}t≥1, f
p
i , f
ξ
i )i∈N . In order to construct a strongly convergent variant of Ψ
we will require that Ψ obtain weak convergence in sufficiently robust sense as stated
in the following assumption.
A. 8. For the stage game Γ and equilibrium set E, the FP-type algorithm Ψ is
such that for any sequence (ǫt)t≥1 satisfying limt→∞ ǫt = 0, the FP-type algorithm Ψ
11In most literature, the notion of an empirical distribution refers strictly to the time-averaged
empirical histogram of a player’s action choices, as in classical FP (3.1). However, as discussed in
Section 2, we use the term empirical distribution more generally to refer to an arbitrarily formed
(see A.4) distribution that a player uses to track information regarding opponents’ empirical action
histories. This abuse of terminology allows us to more naturally extend concepts to the general
FP-type setting.
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obtains weak convergence in the sense that limt→0 d(ξ(t), E) = 0.
The above assumption ensures that the FP-type algorithm is robust to asymp-
totically decaying perturbations in a player’s best response set. When studying the
strongly convergent variant of Ψ in the following section, the assumptionA.8 will serve
to ensure that convergence of the process is not disrupted by minor asynchronies in
the number of deliberate best responses taken by each player (i.e., minor disparities
in (4.3)).
5.2. Examples.
5.2.1. Classical Fictitious Play. Classical FP (Section 3.1) fits the template
of an FP-type algorithm with qi(t) =
1
t
∑t
s=1 ai(s). Note that qi(t) may be written
in recursive form as: qi(t+1) = qi(t)+ 1/(t+1) (ai(t+ 1)− qi(t)). Thus, ‖qi(t+1)−
qi(t)‖ ≤
Mi
t+1 , where Mi := supp′i,p′′i ∈∆i ‖p
′
i − p
′′
i ‖, and A.5 is satisfied. The prediction
map fpi is given by the identity function, and convergence map f
ξ
i also given by the
identity function. The target equilibrium set is given by E := NE, the set of Nash
equilibria.
5.2.2. Generalized Weakened Fictitious Play. Leslie et al. [11] study a use-
ful generalization of FP, termed Generalized Weakened FP (GWFP), in which players
are permitted to choose a suboptimal best response each round, so long as the degree
of suboptimality decays asymptotically to zero, and in which step-size sequences other
than {1/t}t≥1 are permitted.
Formally, for p−i ∈ ∆−i and ǫ ≥ 0, let
12 ¯BRǫi(p−i) := {pi ∈ ∆i : Ui(pi, p−i) ≥
maxαi∈Ai Ui(αi, p−i)− ǫ}, and for p ∈ ∆
n, let ¯BRǫ(p) := ( ¯BRǫ1(p−1), . . . ,
¯BRǫn(p−n)).
A sequence {q(t)}t≥1 is said to be a GWFP process if q(t+ 1) ∈ (1− γ(t+ 1))q(t) +
γ(t + 1)( ¯BRǫt(q(t)) + Mt+1) with γ(t) → 0 and ǫt → 0 as t → ∞,
∑
t≥1 γ(t) =
∞, and {Mt}t≥1 is a deterministic (or stochastic) perturbation sequence satisfying
lim
t→∞
supk{‖
∑k−1
i=t γi+1Mi+1‖ :
∑k−1
i=t γi+1 ≤ T } = 0 (a.s.).
We consider a special case of GWFP in whichMt = 0, ∀t and the ǫ-best response
set is restricted to the set of pure strategy ǫ-best responses. That is, we consider the
subset of GWFP process such that a(t+ 1) ∈ BRǫt(q−i(t)), and,
q(t+ 1) = q(t) + γ(t+ 1) (a(t+ 1)− q(t)) , (5.1)
with ǫt → 0, and in a slight variation of terminology we refer to the sequence of
actions {a(t)}t≥1 satisfying the above as a GWFP process.
In the terminology of Section 5.1, GWFP fits the template of an FP-type algo-
rithm with the empirical distribution qi(t) defined recursively as in (5.1) (where it is
assumed that limt→∞ γ(t) = 0), the prediction map f
p
i given by the identity function
for all i, and the convergence map f ξi given by the identity function for all i, and the
target equilibrium set is given by E := NE—the set of Nash equilibria.
5.2.3. Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play—Learning Consensus Equi-
libria. Empirical Centroid FP (ECFP) was conceived as a variant of FP suited to
implementation in large-scale games [12, 13]. In ECFP, rather than tracking the em-
pirical distribution of each individual opponent (as in FP), players track and respond
12The set ¯BRǫi (p−i) defined below differs from the set BR
ǫ
i (p−i) defined in the preliminaries in
that ¯BRǫi (p−i) includes all mixed strategy best responses, whereas BR
ǫ
i (p−i) contains only the pure
strategy best responses. The set ¯BRǫi (p−i) is used here in order to precisely define a GWFP process
as given in [11], but the remainder of the paper focuses on the set BRǫi (p−i).
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to only the centroid of the empirical distributions. In order to ensure the process is
well defined the following assumption is made:
A. 9. All players use the same strategy space. Under this assumption, let the
empirical distribution be defined by
qi(t) :=
1
t
t∑
s=1
ai(s), (5.2)
and let the empirical centroid distribution be defined by q¯(t) := 1
n
∑
i∈N qi(t). We say
a sequence of actions {a(t)}t≥1 is an ECFP process if for all i and all t ≥ 1,
ai(t+ 1) ∈ BR
ǫt
i (q¯−i(t)), (5.3)
where q¯−i(t) = (q¯(t), . . . , q¯(t)) ∈
∏
j 6=i∆j is the (n − 1)-tuple containing (n − 1)
repeated copies of q¯(t), and {ǫt}t≥1 is a sequence satisfying limt→∞ ǫt = 0.
In ECFP, players learn elements of the set of consensus Nash equilibria13, defined
by C := {p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ NE : p1 = p2 = . . . = pn}, the subset of Nash
equilibria in which all players use identical strategies (see [12] for more details). Define
q¯n(t) := (q¯(t), . . . , q¯(t)) ∈ ∆n to be the n-tuple containing repeated copies of q¯(t);
learning in ECFP takes place in the sense that limt→∞ d(q¯
n(t), C) = 0.
In the terminology of Section 5.1, ECFP fits the template of an FP-type algo-
rithm with the empirical distribution given by (5.2), the prediction map fpi given
by fpi (q(t)) :=
(
1
n
∑
j∈N qj(t), . . . ,
1
n
∑
j∈N qj(t)
)
, ∀i, where the right-hand side is a
(n − 1)-tuple containing repeated copies of q¯(t), and the convergence map given by
f ξi (q(t)) :=
1
n
∑n
j=1 qj(t), ∀i. The target equilibrium set is given by E := C, the set
of consensus Nash equilibria.
5.2.4. Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play—Learning Mean-Centric Equi-
libria. In this section we consider a slight modification of the ECFP algorithm pre-
sented in Section 5.2.3 that enables players to learn elements of an alternate (non-
Nash) equilibrium set.
Let an ECFP action process be defined as in (5.3). Define the set of mean-centric
equilibria by MCE := {p ∈ ∆n : Ui(pi, p¯−i) ≥ Ui(p
′
i, p¯−i) ∀p
′
i ∈ ∆i, ∀i}. The set
of MCE is neither a superset nor a subset of the NE—rather, it is a set of natural
equilibrium points tailored to the ECFP dynamics [33]. The set of consensus Nash
equilibria C (see Section 5.2.3) however, is contained in the set of MCE.
In ECFP, players learn elements of MCE in the sense that limt→∞ d(q(t), MCE) =
0. In the terminology of Section 5.1, this fits the template of an FP-type algorithm
with qi(t) given by (5.2), f
p
i defined in the same way as in Section 5.2.3, the conver-
gence map f ξi given by the identity for all i, and the target equilibrium set given by
E := MCE.
Note that the only difference between the ECFP algorithm discussed in the Sec-
tion 5.2.3 and the ECFP algorithm discussed here is the choice of target equilibrium
set E and convergence maps f ξi .
5.3. Strongly Convergent Variant of an FP-type Algorithm. In this sec-
tion we construct the strongly convergent variant of an FP-type learning algorithm.
13We assume here that the set of consensus Nash equilibria is non-empty. When revisiting ECFP
in Section 6.3, we provide an assumption on the utility structure that ensures that the set is indeed
non-empty.
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The construction here is a generalization of that of Section 4.1 where we constructed
the strongly convergent variant of classical FP.
Let Ψ = ({f qi (·, t)}t≥1, f
p
i , f
ξ
i )i∈N be an FP-type learning algorithm. For
each i ∈ N , let {Xi(t)}t≥1 be a sequence of random variables with Xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
Analogous to Section 4, Xi(t) = 1 will serve to indicate that player i took a deliberate
best response in round t. Let
ℓi(t) :=
t∑
s=1
Xi(s) (5.4)
count the number of deliberate best responses taken by player i through t.
In Section 4.1 the empirical distribution of player i, (4.4), is a time average taken
only over rounds when player i took a deliberate best response. In order to generalize
this notion to an FP-type algorithm, define the term
τi(s) := inf{t : ℓi(t) = s}. (5.5)
For s ≥ 1, τi(s) indicates the round when player i took their s-th deliberate best
response,14 and the sequence {τi(s)}s≥1 gives the subsequence of rounds when player
i took a deliberate best response. For t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} let H¯i(t) := {ai(τi(s)) : τi(s) ≤ t}
denote the action history of player i. Note that H¯(t) records only the history of actions
that were taken as deliberate best responses. Let the empirical distribution of player
i at time t be formed as
qi(t) := f
q
i (H¯i(t), ℓi(t)). (5.6)
Let the asymptotic learning distribution (see A.7 and subsequent discussion) be given
by ξi(t) := f
ξ
i (q(t)) and ξ(t) := (ξ1(t), . . . , ξi(t)).
Let the action for player i in round t ≥ 2 be chosen according to the random
rule15
ai(t) ∼ g
′
i(t) :=
{
bi(t− 1), if Xi(t) = 1,
ξi(t− 1), otherwise,
(5.7)
where pi(t− 1) = f
p
i (q(t− 1)), and bi(t− 1) ∈ BR
ηt
i (pi(t− 1)), and assume:
16
A. 10. The sequence (ηt)t≥1 associated with bi(t) of (5.7) is such that lim
t→∞
ηt = 0.
Let Ft := σ({a(s), Xi(s), . . . , Xn(s), b1(s), . . . , bn(s)}s≤t). Let the probability that
player i chooses a deliberate best response in round t conditioned on past events be
given by ρi(t) := P(Xi(t) = 1|Ft−1), and assumeA.1–A.3 hold. Note that qi(t), pi(t),
ξi(t), and g
′
i(t) are Ft–measurable and that by definition, ρi(t) is Ft−1–measurable.
Finally, let
gi(t) := bi(t− 1)ρi(t) + ξi(t)(1 − ρi(t)). (5.8)
Note that gi(t) is Ft−1–measurable and that g(αi, t) = P(ai(t) = αi|Ft−1); that is,
gi(t) represents the mixed strategy in use by player i in round t (compare with (4.5)).
14Note that by (5.10), τi(s) is finite valued a.s. for any s ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
15To initialize the process, let the action ai(1) be chosen arbitrarily, let Xi(1) = 1, and let
H¯(1) = ai(1) for all i.
16Note that this assumption subsumes the more typical assumption that ηt = 0, ∀t. By making
this more general assumption we are able to handle interesting scenarios that may arise in a practical
implementation of the algorithm; e.g., players have some asymptotically decaying error in their
knowledge of their utility function or knowledge of opponent’s empirical distributions.
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Let g(t) := (g1(t), . . . , gn(t)) denote the joint mixed strategy in use at time t.
We refer to a process where, for each player i, qi(t) is updated according to (5.6),
ai(t) is updated according to (5.7), and gi(t) is updated according to (5.8) as the
strongly convergent variant of Ψ (for reasons to be clear soon—see Theorem 5.1).
In Section 6 we will demonstrate applications of this in the context of the previous
examples.
5.4. General Result. The following theorem provides the general result from
which the strong convergence of various FP-type algorithms can be derived.
Theorem 5.1. Let Γ be a finite normal form game, let E be an equilibrium set,
and let Ψ be an FP-type algorithm satisfying A.4–A.8. If the strongly convergent
variant of Ψ satisfies A.1–A.3 and A.10 then it achieves strong learning in the
sense that limt→∞ d(g(t), E) = 0, almost surely.
We emphasize that in the above result players’ period-by-period mixed strate-
gies g(t) are converging to equilibrium. In general, when seeking to construct the
strongly convergent variant of some FP-type algorithm Ψ, the most challenging as-
pect of applying Theorem 5.1 is the verification that Ψ satisfies A.8. The remaining
assumptions A.4–A.7 are generally fairly trivial to verify. Assumptions A.1–A.3
and A.10 pertain to the manner in which the strongly convergent variant of Ψ is
constructed and are not related to intrinsic properties of Ψ itself.
5.5. Some Additional Definitions. In order to prove Theorem 5.1 we will
study the behavior of an underlying FP-type process that is embedded in the action,
history, and empirical distribution processes produced by the strongly convergent
variant of Ψ. In particular, for i ∈ N and s ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let τi(s) be defined as in (5.5),
and define the following terms: a˜i(s) := ai(τi(s)), a˜(s) := (a˜1(s), . . . , a˜n(s)), H˜i(s) :=
H¯i(τi(s)), q˜i(s) := qi(τi(s)), q˜(s) := (q˜1(s), . . . , q˜n(s)), p˜i(s) := f
p
i (q˜(s)), ξ˜(s) :=
(f ξ1 (q˜(s)), . . . , f
ξ
n(q˜(s))). The aforementioned terms (marked with a tilde) correspond
to to the embedded FP-type process that we will study in the proof of Theorem
5.1. In particular, for each player i, the sequence {τi(s)}s≥1 denotes the subsequence
of rounds when the player chose to play a deliberate best response. The sequence
a˜i(s)s≥1 is the action sequence occurring along the subsequence of rounds when player
i chose to play a deliberate best response. The sequence {H˜i(s)}s≥1 corresponds to
the action history of player i along the same subsequence. The sequence {q˜i(s)}s≥1
corresponds to the empirical distribution of player i along the same subsequence;
in particular, note that by Lemma 7.5 (see appendix), {q˜i(s)}s≥1 fits the format
prescribed by A.4 for the embedded FP-type process: q˜i(s) = f
q
i (H˜(s), s). Finally,
the term ξ˜(s) is the asymptotic learning distribution associated with the embedded
FP-type process.
In studying the embedded FP-type process, it will be important to characterize
the terms to which players are best responding. With this in mind, note that per
(5.7), the action at time τi(s+1) (in the strongly convergent variant of Ψ) is chosen as
ai(τi(s+1)) ∈ BR
ητi(s+1)
i (pi(τi(s+1)−1)). In order to translate this to the embedded
FP-type process, define the following terms: qˆij(s) := qj(τi(s + 1) − 1), qˆ
i(s) :=
(q1(τi(s+1)−1), . . . , qn(τi(s+1)−1)) pˆi(s) := f
p
i (qˆ
i(s)), By construction, the (s+1)-th
action of player i in the embedded FP-type process is chosen as,
a˜i(s+ 1) ∈ BR
ητi(s+1)
i (pˆi(s)). (5.9)
In the embedded FP-type process, the term q˜j(s) may be thought of as the ‘true’
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empirical distribution of player j. The term qˆij(s) may be thought of as the estimate
which player i maintains of q˜j(s), and the term qˆ
i(s) (note the superscript) may be
thought of as player i’s estimate of the joint empirical distribution q˜(s) at the time
of player i’s (s + 1)-th best response. Finally, the term pˆi(s) may be thought of as
player i’s prediction of opponents next-stage strategy given qˆi(s); in particular, note
that—in the embedded FP-type process—player i chooses their stage (s + 1) action
(5.9) as an asymptotic best response to pˆi(s).
5.6. Some Useful Properties. Let
Ω′ := {ω : lim
t→∞
ℓi(t)∑t
k=1 ρi(t)
= 1, ∀i}.
By Lemma 7.6 (see appendix), there holds P(Ω′) = 1. In proving Theorem 5.1 we will
restrict attention to (sample path) realizations in Ω′.
Note that under assumption A.2, there holds {ω : limt→∞ ℓi(t) = ∞, ∀i} ⊃ Ω
′.
By the equivalence {ω : limt→∞ ℓi(t) = ∞, ∀i} = {ω : Xi(t) = 1 infinitely often ∀i},
there holds {ω : Xi(t) = 1 infinitely often ∀i} ⊃ Ω
′. Therefore, by the definitions of
ℓi and τi, there holds for any realization in Ω
′, limt→∞ ℓi(t) =∞, and
τi(s) <∞, ∀s ∈ N, (5.10)
lim
s→∞
τi(s) =∞. (5.11)
These properties will be useful in the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, the proof
will frequently make reference to q˜i(s), or a˜i(s) for arbitrary s ∈ N—the property
(5.10) ensures that such terms are well defined for any ω ∈ Ω′.
Note also that for any realization in Ω′, for i ∈ N and s ∈ {1, 2, . . .},
ℓi(τi(s)) = s, (5.12)
and for i ∈ N and t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
Xi(t) = 1 =⇒ τi(ℓi(t)) = t. (5.13)
Furthermore, note that Xi(t) = 0 implies that ℓi(t) = ℓi(t− 1) and H¯i(t) = H¯i(t− 1),
and in particular,
Xi(t) = 0 =⇒ qi(t) = qi(t− 1). (5.14)
These facts are readily verified by conferring with the definitions of τi, ℓi, and Xi.
5.7. Proof of Theorem 5.1. Proof. Since P(Ω′) = 1 it is sufficient to show
that the desired result holds for any ω ∈ Ω′. Henceforth, we restrict attention to
realizations ω ∈ Ω′, and for ease of notation suppress the term ω when referring to
random variables.
As a first step, we wish to show that lims→∞ d(ξ˜(s), E) = 0. We accomplish this
by showing that there exists a sequence {ǫs}s≥1 such that lims→∞ ǫs = 0 and a˜i(s+
1) ∈ BRǫsi (p˜i(s)). By assumptionA.8, it will then follow that lims→∞ d(ξ˜(s), E) = 0.
To that end, note that by Lemma 7.1 (see appendix), lim
s→∞
|Ui(ai(τi(s+1)), pi(τi(s+
1)− 1))− vi(pi(τi(s+ 1)− 1))| = 0, ∀i, or equivalently by the definitions of a˜(s) and
pˆi(s) (see Section 5.5),
lim
s→∞
|Ui(a˜i(s+ 1)), pˆi(s)) − vi(pˆi(s))| = 0, ∀i. (5.15)
By Lemma 7.3 (see appendix), lims→∞ ‖qˆ
i(s) − q˜(s)‖ = 0. By A.6, it follows that
lims→∞ ‖pˆi(s) − p˜i(s)‖ = 0, which by the Lipschitz continuity of Ui(·) implies that
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lims→∞ |Ui(αi, pˆi(s)) − Ui(αi, p˜i(s))| = 0, ∀αi ∈ Ai, ∀i, and lims→∞ |vi(pˆi(s)) −
vi(p˜i(s))| = 0, ∀i.Returning to (5.15) we see that lim
s→∞
|Ui(a˜i(s+1)), p˜i(s))−vi(p˜i(s))| =
0, ∀i, i.e., there exists a sequence {ǫs}s≥1 such that ǫs → 0 and a˜i(s+1) ∈ BR
ǫs
i (p˜i(s)).
It follows by A.8 that
lim
s→∞
d(ξ˜(s), E) = 0. (5.16)
We now proceed to show that limt→∞ d(ξ(t), E) = 0. Let ε > 0 be given.
By Lemma 7.2 (see appendix) and assumption A.7, for each i ∈ N , there exists a
random time Si > 0 such that ∀s ≥ Si, ‖ξ(τi(s)) − ξ˜(s)‖ <
ε
2 . Let S
′
= maxi{Si}.
By (5.16) there exists a random time S
′′
such that ∀s ≥ S
′′
, d(ξ˜(s), E) < ε2 . Let
S = max{S
′
, S
′′
}. Then
d(ξ(τi(s)), E) < ε, ∀i, ∀s ≥ S. (5.17)
Let T = maxi{τi(S)}. Note that for some i, ξ(T ) = ξ(τi(S)), and therefore by
(5.17),
d(ξ(T ), E) < ε. (5.18)
Also note that for any t0 > T , it holds that ℓi(t0) ≥ S (since ℓi(τi(S)) = S, and
ℓi(t) is non-decreasing in t), and moreover
Xi(t0) = 1 for some i =⇒ q(t0) = q(τi(ℓi(t0))) =⇒ ξ(t0) = ξ(τi(ℓi(t0))),
Xi(t0) = 0 for all i =⇒ q(t0) = q(t0 − 1) =⇒ ξ(t0) = ξ(t0 − 1), (5.19)
where the first implication holds with with ℓi(t0) ≥ S. In the above, the first
line follows from (5.13), and the second line follows from (5.14). Consider t ≥ T . If
for some i, Xi(t) = 1, then by (5.19) and (5.17), d(ξ(t), E) = d(ξ(τi(ℓi(t))), E) < ε.
Otherwise, if Xi(t) = 0 ∀i, then ξ(t) = ξ(t− 1).
Iterate this argument m times until either (i) Xi(t −m) = 1 for some i, or (ii),
t−m = T . In the case of (i), d(ξ(t), E) = d(ξ(t−m), E) = d(ξ(τi(ℓi(t−m))), E) < ε,
where the inequality again follows from (5.17) and the fact that t−m > T =⇒ ℓi(t−
m) ≥ S. In the case of (ii), d(ξ(t), E) = d(ξ(T ), E) < ε, where the inequality follows
from (5.18). Since ε > 0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that lim
t→∞
d(ξ(t), E) = 0.
Finally, we show that limt→∞ d(g(t), E) = 0. Note that by (5.8), ‖gi(t)− ξi(t−
1)‖ ≤ Miρi(t), ∀i, where Mi := maxp′,p′′∈∆i ‖p
′ − p′′‖ is a constant. Invoking as-
sumption A.1 gives, lim
t→∞
‖gi(t) − ξi(t − 1)‖ = 0, ∀i. Combining this with the fact
that lim
t→∞
d(ξ(t), E) = 0 yields the desired result, limt→∞ d(g(t), E) = 0.
6. Applications of the General Result. In this section we consider three
different FP-type algorithms and study the strongly convergent variant of each. In
each case, we prove strong convergence by showing that the FP-type algorithm fits the
template of Theorem 5.1. Generally, the only non-trivial aspect of applying Theorem
5.1 will be to show that A.8 is satisfied.
In Section 6.1 we consider classical FP. The fact that classical FP satisfies A.8
was shown by Leslie et al. [11]. In Section 6.2 we consider GWFP—a generalization
of FP proposed in [11]. Again, the crucial step of showing that GWFP satisfies A.8
was shown in [11]. In Section 6.3 we consider a variant of FP termed ECFP. That
ECFP satisfies A.8 was shown in [34]. We emphasize that each of these algorithms
is known to achieve weak learning in the sense that d(ξ(t), E) → 0 as t → ∞. Our
contribution is to construct a variant where players also achieve learning in the strong
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sense that period-by-period mixed strategies also converge to equilibrium.
6.1. Strong Convergence in Classical FP. We now prove Corollary 1 using
the general convergence result of Theorem 5.1.
Proof. Classical FP fits the template of an FP-type algorithm with the empirical
distribution given by qi(t) =
1
t
∑t
s=1 ai(s), the functions f
p
i and f
ξ
i given by the
identity function for each i, and the best response perturbation given by ǫt = 0, ∀t.
To show that the strongly convergent variant of classical FP attains strong learning,
it suffices to show that the assumptions of Theorem 5.1 are met.
To that end, note that A.1–A.3 are satisfied by assumption, and A.10 is trivially
satisfied (with ηt = 0, ∀t). Furthermore, the empirical distribution sequence satisfies
limt→∞ ‖qi(t) − qi(t − 1)‖ = 0 (see Section 5.2.1), and hence A.5 is satisfied. The
functions fpi and f
ξ
i (each being the identity function) satisfy A.6–A.7. Therefore, it
is sufficient to show that A.8 is satisfied. But, for zero-sum games, potential games,
and generic 2×m games this holds by [11], Corollary 5.
6.2. Strong Convergence in Generalized Weakened FP. GWFP was in-
troduced in Section 5.2.2, where it was shown to fit the template of an FP-type
algorithm.
Since, by definition, a GWFP process allows players to choose an ǫt sub-optimal
best response with ǫt → 0, the following result ( [11], Corollary 5) guarantees a GWFP
process satisfies A.8 in the noted classes of games.
Theorem 6.1. Any generalized weakened fictitious play process will converge to
the set of Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games, potential games, and generic
2×m games.
To clarify the precise meaning of the convergence stated above as it relates to the
present work, we emphasize that Theorem 6.1 implies that limt→∞ d(q(t), NE) = 0;
i.e., the process converges weakly to equilibrium.
Let the strongly convergent variant of GWFP be constructed using the approach
laid out in Section 5.3. The following Corollary to Theorem 5.1 states that the strongly
convergent variant of a GWFP process will achieve strong learning.17
Corollary 2. Let Γ be a two-player zero-sum game, potential game, or generic
2 × m game. Let Ψ be an instance of GWFP. If the strongly convergent variant
of Ψ satisfies A.1–A3 and A.10, then it achieves strong learning in the sense that
limt→∞ d(g(t), NE) = 0.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the conditions of Theorem 5.1 are met. Note
that A.1–A.3, A.10 hold by assumption. Furthermore, by definition, any GWFP
process satisfies limt→∞ γ(t) = 0, and hence satisfies A.5. The functions f
p
i and f
ξ
i
are given by the identity function for each i, and hence A.6 and A.7 hold. Thus,
it suffices to show that A.8 holds for the specified class of games—but, this follows
from Theorem 6.1.
6.3. Strong Convergence in Empirical Centroid FP. ECFP was intro-
duced in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. It In order to study the asymptotic behavior of
ECFP (in either of the above formats introduced in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4) we make
the following assumption regarding the structure of players’ utility functions:
A. 11. The players’ utility functions are identical and permutation invariant.
That is, for any i, j ∈ N , ui(y) = uj(y), and u([y
′]i, [y
′′]j , y−(i,j)) = u([y
′′]i, [y
′]j , y−(i,j)),
17It should be noted that classical FP may be seen as an instance of GWFP, and thus Corollary
1 may in fact be deduced as a corollary to Corollary 2. However, for clarity and continuity of
presentation, the results regarding classical FP have been presented separately.
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where, for any player k ∈ N , the notation [y′]k indicates the action y
′ ∈ Yk being
played by player k, and y−(i,j) denotes the set of actions being played by all players
other than i and j.
We note that, under this assumption, the sets C and MCE are nonempty [12,
33]. The following theorem ( [34], Theorem 1) specifies the manner in which players
engaged in an ECFP process (weakly) learn elements of the sets C and MCE.
Theorem 6.2. Let {a(t)}t≥1 be an ECFP process.
Assume Γ is such that A.9 and A.11 hold. Then players learn equilibrium strategies
in the sense that (i) limt→∞ d(q¯
n(t), C) = 0, and (ii) limt→∞ d(q(t), MCE) = 0.
Note that case (i) above corresponds to ECFP with the convergence map f ξi as
given in Section 5.2.3, and case (ii) corresponds to the convergence map f ξi given by
the identity function (as in Section 5.2.4). Since, by definition, an ECFP process
(5.3) allows players to choose actions from the ǫt-sub-optimal best response set with
ǫt → 0, Theorem 6.2 ensures that ECFP satisfies A.8.
Let Ψ be an instance of ECFP as presented in either Section 5.2.3 or Section
5.2.4, and let the strongly convergent variant of Ψ be constructed using the approach
laid out in Section 5.3. The following corollary to Theorem 5.1 states that players
engaged in the strongly convergent variant of an ECFP process learn elements of C
and MCE in the strong sense that players’ period-by-period strategies converge to
equilibrium.
Corollary 3. (i) Let Ψ be an instance of ECFP with f ξi (q) =
1
n
∑
j qj , ∀i
and assume Γ is such that A.9 and A.11 hold. If the strongly convergent variant
of Ψ satisfies A.1–A.3 and A.10, then it achieves strong learning in the sense that
limt→0 d(g(t), C) = 0.
(ii) Let Ψ be an instance of ECFP with f ξi (q) given by the identity function for all
i and assume Γ is such that A.9 and A.11 hold. If the strongly convergent variant
of Ψ satisfies A.1–A.3 and A.10, then it achieves strong learning in the sense that
limt→0 d(g(t), MCE) = 0.
Proof. Cases (i) and (ii) differ only in terms of the function f ξi (t) and target
equilibrium set E. However, in both cases the function f ξi satisfies A.7. It suffices
to show the remaining conditions of Theorem 5.1 are satisfied. Henceforth we treat
cases (i) and (ii) equivalently.
Note that A.1–A.3 and A.10 hold by assumption. The empirical distribution
sequence satisfies ‖qi(t)−qi(t−1)‖ ≤
Mi
t
→ 0 as t→∞, whereMi := supp′,p′′∈∆i ‖p
′−
p′′‖, and hence A.5 is satisfied. Note that the function fpi (q) =
1
n
∑
j qj satisfies A.6.
Finally, Theorem 6.2 shows that A.8 is satisfied.
7. Conclusions. An algorithm is said to achieve weak learning if players learn
an equilibrium strategy in an abstract sense (see Section 2), but period-by-period
strategies do not necessarily converge to equilibrium. An algorithm is said to achieve
strong learning if (additionally) players’ period-by-period strategies converge to equi-
librium. Weak learning may be thought of as a form of learning where players learn a
strategy in some abstract sense, but never begin to implement the strategy they are
learning. On the other hand, in strong learning, not only do players learn a strategy,
but they also physically implement the learned strategy through the course of the
learning process.
Fictitious Play (FP) and its variants are known to exhibit weak learning but
not necessarily strong learning. An approach was presented for taking a general
FP-type algorithm that achieves weak learning, and constructing from it a strongly
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convergent variant of the algorithm. General convergence results were proved and
used to construct a strongly convergent variant of several example FP-type processes.
In order to apply the convergence results proved in this paper, it is necessary
to ensure a candidate algorithm meets A.8 (the other necessary assumptions are
relatively trivial to verify). An interesting future research direction might be to in-
vestigate other FP-type algorithms (e.g., [32, 35]) and verify whether they meet the
assumptions sufficient for construction of a strongly convergent variant.
Appendix.
7.1. Some Useful Inequalities. We consider some useful inequalities related to the
strongly convergent variant of an FP-type algorithm. We restrict attention to realizations
ω ∈ Ω′. Let {qi(t)}t≥1 be given by (5.6). By A.5 there exists a sequence γ(t) such that
lim
t→∞
γ(t) = 0, and for each i ∈ N ,
‖qi(t+ 1)− qi(t)‖ ≤Miγ(ℓi(t)), (7.1)
where Mi := supq′,q′′∈∆i ‖q
′ − q′′‖. Similarly, there holds for any integer s > 0,
‖q˜(s+ 1)− q˜(s)‖ ≤Mγ(s), (7.2)
where M := supq′,q′′∈∆n ‖q
′ − q′′‖. More generally, for any integers s1, s2 > 0, if A.5 holds
then,
‖q˜(s1)− q˜(s2)‖ ≤M
max{s1,s2}−1∑
s=min{s1,s2}
γ(s) ≤ |s1 − s2|B, (7.3)
where 0 < B <∞ is such that supt γ(t) ≤ B/M .
7.2. Intermediate Results.
Lemma 7.1. Let τi(s) be defined as in section 5.5, and assume A.10 holds. Then for
any realization in Ω′ there holds, lim
s→∞
|Ui(ai(τi(s)), pi(τi(s)−1))−vi(pi(τi(s)−1))| = 0, ∀i.
Proof. Let s ∈ N. Note that by definition τi(s) := inf{t : ℓi(t) = s} and ℓi(t) :=∑t
k=1Xi(k), thusXi(τi(s)) = 1. By (5.7) this implies ai(τi(s)) = bi(τi(s)) ∈ BR
ητi(s)
i (pi(τi(s)−
1)), which implies |Ui(ai(τi(s)), pi(τi(s)− 1)) − vi(pi(τi(s)− 1))| ≤ ητi(s). By A.10, ηt → 0
as t → ∞, and moreover, by (5.11), τi(s) → ∞ as s → ∞. Thus ητi(s) → 0 as s → ∞, and
the claim holds.
Lemma 7.2. Let i, j ∈ N , let τi(s) and q˜j(s) be defined as in Section 5.5, and assume
A.2–A.3 hold. Then for any realization in Ω′, lims→∞ ‖qj(τi(s))− q˜j(s)‖ = 0.
Proof. Note that for any t ∈ N, qj(t) = qj(τj(ℓj(t))) = q˜j(ℓj(t)), where the first equality
follows from Lemma 7.4, and the second equality follows from the definition of q˜i(s). Hence,
‖qj(τi(s))− q˜j(s)‖ = ‖q˜j(ℓj(τi(s)))− q˜j(s)‖ = ‖q˜j(ℓj(τi(s)))− q˜j(ℓi(τi(s)))‖
≤ |ℓj(τi(s))− ℓi(τi(s))|B,
where the first equality follows from the previous statement, and the second equality
follows from the fact that ℓi(τi(s)) = s (see (5.12)), and the final inequality follows from
(7.3). Thus, it suffices to show that
lim
s→∞
|ℓj(τi(s))− ℓi(τi(s))| = 0. (7.4)
For convenience in notation let hi(t) :=
∑t
m=1 ρi(m). By Lemma 7.6 and the definition
of Ω′ there holds for any k ∈ N , limt→∞
ℓk(t)
hk(t)
= 1. By assumption A.3, for any k ∈ N ,
limt→∞ (hk(t)/(hi(t)) = 1. Hence, for any k ∈ N ,
lim
t→∞
ℓk(t)
hi(t)
= lim
t→∞
ℓk(t)
hk(t)
hk(t)
hi(t)
= 1. (7.5)
Returning attention to (7.4) and recalling that by (5.11), lims→∞ τi(s) =∞ on Ω
′, we have,
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lim sup
s→∞
|ℓj(τi(s))− ℓi(τi(s))| ≤ lim sup
t→∞
|ℓj(t)− ℓi(t)| = lim sup
t→∞
∣∣∣∣
ℓj(t)
hi(t)
hi(t)−
ℓi(t)
hi(t)
hi(t)
∣∣∣∣
= lim sup
t→∞
|hi(t)− hi(t)| = 0,
where the transition to the last line follows from application of (7.5). Thus, (7.4) is verified,
and the desired result holds.
Lemma 7.3. Let i, j ∈ N , let qˆij(s) and q˜j(s) be defined as in Section 5.5, and assume
A.2–A.3 hold. Then for any realization in Ω′ there holds lims→∞ ‖qˆ
i
j(s)− q˜j(s)‖ = 0.
Proof. Recall that by definition, qˆij(s) = qj(τi(s+ 1)− 1); our objective then is to show
that lims→∞ ‖qj(τi(s+1)− 1)− q˜j(s)‖ = 0. By Lemma 7.2, lim
s→∞
‖qj(τi(s))− q˜j(s)‖ = 0. By
(7.2) and A.5 there holds, lim
s→∞
‖q˜j(s + 1) − q˜j(s)‖ = 0. Combining this with the previous
statement,
lim
s→∞
‖qj(τi(s+ 1))− q˜j(s)‖ = 0. (7.6)
Recalling (7.1), there holds,
lim sup
s→∞
‖qj(τi(s+ 1)− 1)− qj(τi(s+ 1))‖ ≤ lim sup
s→∞
Mjγ(ℓj(τi(s+ 1))) = 0, (7.7)
where the equality holds since lims→∞ ℓj(τi(s)) =∞ on Ω
′, and by A.5, lims→∞ γ(s) = 0.
Consider now the quantity of interest,
‖qj(τi(s+ 1)− 1)− q˜j(s)‖ ≤‖qj(τi(s+ 1) − 1) − qj(τi(s+ 1))‖+ ‖qj(τi(s+ 1))− q˜j(s)‖.
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) goes to zero by (7.7) and the second term on
the RHS goes to zero by (7.6). Thus, lim
s→∞
‖qj(τi(s + 1) − 1) − q˜j(s)‖ = 0, and the claim
holds.
Lemma 7.4. Let i ∈ N , let qi(·) be as defined in (5.6), let ℓi(·) be as defined in (5.4),
and let τi(·) be as defined in (5.5). Then for every realization in Ω
′ and any t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
there holds qi(τi(ℓi(t))) = qi(t).
Proof. Let t0 := τi(ℓi(t)) = inf{t
′ : ℓi(t
′) = ℓi(t)}, where the second equality follows from
the definition of τi(·). Note that t0 ≤ t and by definition of t0, there holds τi(ℓi(t0)) = t0,
and hence qi(τi(ℓi(t0))) = qi(t0). Furthermore, by the definition of t0, for t0 ≤ t
′ ≤ t,
there holds ℓi(t) = ℓi(t
′) = ℓi(t0), and hence τi(ℓi(t)) = τi(ℓi(t0)). Moreover, the fact that
ℓi(t) = ℓi(t
′) = ℓi(t0) implies by definition of ℓi(·) that Xi(t
′) = 0 for t0 < t
′ ≤ t (if
such a t′ exists). Thus, by (5.14) there holds qi(t) = qi(t
′) = qi(t0) for t0 ≤ t
′ ≤ t, and
in particular qi(t) = qi(t0). Combining this with the facts that qi(τi(ℓi(t0))) = qi(t0) and
τi(ℓi(t)) = τi(ℓi(t0)) yields the desired result.
Lemma 7.5. Let Ψ = ({fqi (·, t)}t≥1, f
p
i , f
ξ
i )i∈N be an FP-type algorithm, and let the
strongly convergent variant of Ψ be constructed as in Section 5.3. Let a˜(s), H˜(s), and q˜i(s) be
as defined in Section 5.5. Then for every realization in Ω′, and for s ≥ 1, q˜i(s) = f
q
i (H˜(s), s).
Proof. For s ≥ 1, note that q˜i(s) = qi(τi(s)) = f
q
i (H¯i(τi(s)), ℓi(τi(s))) = f
q
i (H˜(s), s),
where the first equality follows from the definition of q˜i(s) in Section 5.5, the second follows
from A.4, and the third follows from the definition of H˜i(s) in Section 5.5 and (5.12).
Lemma 7.6. Let {X(t)}t≥1 be 0− 1 Bernoulli random variables, let ℓ(t) :=
∑t
k=1X(k)
be the associated counting process, let Gt := σ({X(k)}
t
k=1), and let ρ(t) = P(X(t) = 1|Gt−1).
Assume
∑
t≥1 ρ(t) =∞. Then there holds, limt→∞
(ℓ(t)) /
(∑t
k=1 ρ(t)
)
= 1, a.s.
Proof. The result follows via Levi’s extension of the Borel-Cantelli Lemmas, [30] p.124.
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